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1 Introduction 
After a long period of relative neglect, the recent global food crisis has put 
agricultural development and food security firmly back on the development agenda. A 
key example of this development was the release the 2008 World Development 
Report by the World Bank that was fully devoted the theme of “Agriculture for 
Development” (World Bank 2007). The estimated 100 million rise in food insecure 
people (FAO 2010) combined with social unrest and political instability in a 
substantial number of developing countries, has led to a proliferation of new 
agricultural aid programs by international institutions, bilateral donors and developing 
countries (see Abbott and Batisti (2009) for a recent overview). During the G8 
summit in L'Aquila developed countries pledged to allocate no less than €20 billion to 
support agricultural development in food insecure regions. As a consequence, aid 
flows to agriculture have started to increase again after 15 years of decline (Figure 1). 
Taking into account the present discussions on climate change, energy crisis and food 
security, a new food price surge in 2011 and the implementation of the proposed 
intervention programs, aid to agriculture is expected to keep on growing in the future.  
  
Figure 1: Bilateral aid to agriculture, 1967-2009 
 
 
Source: OECD DAC Aid statistics Database. 
 
But what determines the allocation of aid to agriculture? Is it distributed on the basis 
of good governance and general needs, mainly poverty. Do donor self-interest play a 
role? Or are agricultural specific factors important such as the state of the agricultural 
sector and domestic food security issues? Answers to these questions are important 
for several reasons. First, agricultural aid flows, which are already substantial in a few 
countries, are expected to become larger in the future. An example is the increasing 
support of donors to implement the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development 
Programme (CAADP), an Africa-wide initiative to boost agricultural expansion. As 
new agricultural initiatives by donors are expected to have considerable economic and 
social impact on recipient countries, understanding how aid to agriculture is allocated 
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is relevant. Second, although not undisputed, several studies have found that aid is 
most effective when it benefits poor countries with reasonable adequate institutions 
and economic policies (Burnside and David Dollar 2000; Collier and David Dollar 
2002).1 This has reinforced the view that aid should be allocated selectively and only 
should benefit countries with the highest ‘need’ as well as a good governance record. 
This paper examines whether these criteria also play a role in the allocation of aid to 
agriculture.    
 
There exists an extensive literature, examining the allocation of aid that goes back to 
the 1970s (see Neumayer (2003a) for an overview). Almost all work, however, has 
analysed aggregate aid flows. A notable exception is Thiele et al. (2007), who test if 
sectoral aid allocation is in accordance with the Millennium Development Goals. 
Another group of studies, which is related to this paper, that also takes a disaggregate 
approach, investigates the allocation of food aid (Neumayer 2005; Kuhlgatz, Abdulai, 
and Barrett 2010).  
 
This paper is a first attempt to analyse the allocation of aid to agriculture. More 
specifically, it looks at the aid patterns of three donor countries: USA, Japan and the 
Netherlands, taking into account donor self-interest, recipient need and governance 
factors for the period 1995-2008.2 These countries differ substantially in terms of 
development policy, aid strategies and geopolitical interests and are therefore 
interesting to compare. The USA and Japan are known as big aid donors, which tend 
to pursue their own interest, while the Netherlands is considered as one of the like-
minded countries that traditionally regard poverty alleviation as the main aim of aid 
policy (Neumayer 2003). These differences are also reflected by the CDG’s 
Commitment to Development Index, which annually ranks the quality of aid policy of 
22 major donors. The Netherlands has consistently been a top performer, while the 
USA has been ranked as mediocre and Japan near bottom.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 I describe the research design, 
including the main variables, data and econometric models. Section 3 presents the 
results of the analysis and Section 4 summarises the main conclusions of the paper. 
2 Research Design 
2.1 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is aid commitments to agriculture. All data are taken from the 
Creditor Reporting System (CRS), the sectorally disaggregated Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) database on aid flows. Agriculture is broadly defined as 
agriculture, forestry and fishing (310) in the CRS. It excludes rural development 
(classified as multi-sector aid), developmental food aid (general programme 
assistance) and emergency food aid (humanitarian assistance). It can be further broken 
down into a number of specific 5-digit categories which can be grouped under (1) 
agricultural policy; (2) agricultural production; (3) agricultural water resources (4); 
agricultural inputs; (5) agricultural education, research and services; (6) forestry; and 
                                                 
1
 Several studies have tested the Burnside and Dollar model and found different results depending on 
the model specification and time period covered (e.g. Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2004; Roodman 
2007). 
2
 The next version of this paper will also include an analysis of several other large donors (e.g. 
Denmark, France, Germany, UK and Sweden) for comparison. 
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(7) fishing (OECD-DAC 2010). Most donors will give aid to agriculture on the basis 
of (country specific) agricultural development strategies that encompass all these 
categories. For this reason no attempt has been made to investigate aid allocation at 
lower levels of aggregation.    
 
In the aid allocation research, some authors have used aid disbursements as dependent 
variable (e.g. Claessens, Cassimon, and Van Campenhout 2009; David Dollar and 
Levin 2006), while others have used aid commitments (e.g. Neumayer 2003a; 
Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Berthelemy 2006). Here, I choose to focus on the latter. 
As has been pointed out by McGillivray and White (1995), aid commitments best 
reflect donor decisions because they have most control over it. Aid disbursements, in 
contrast, also depend for a large part on other factors such as the recipients’ 
administrative capacity to tap into the funds. Hence, they do not purely reflect donor 
decisions and may therefore distort the analysis.    
 
Aid to agriculture is expressed in constant 2008 US dollars (as presented in the CRS) 
and logged to make its distribution less skewed. Following Cohen and Levin (2006), I 
apply a monotonic transformation (1+aid receipts) to ensure that the observations with 
zero aid are retained in the analysis. Another option would have been to use aid per 
capita as the dependent variable as has been done in several other studies. 
McGillivray and Ockzowski (1992) point out that donors have a fixed aid budget 
which need to be divided over a set of potential donors. This is most easily done by 
allocating a share of the total amount of aid available to each recipient country than 
using aid per capita figures which may result in overshooting or undershooting of the 
total budget. For this reason, I have decided to use total aid to agriculture as the 
dependent variable. A measure for rural population is included as independent 
variable to control for the fact that, all else equal, developing countries with large 
rural sectors are likely to receive more aid than countries where this sector is small.  
2.2 Independent Variables 
The allocation of aid depends on the need and merits of developing countries as well 
as donors’ self-interest (Neumayer 2003a). In addition, the last two decades donors 
and recipients have more and more emphasised the need to improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the aid system. Among others, this resulted in the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action in which 
donors and recipients agreed on standards and guidelines on effective aid. 
Consequently, donors have become more selective in giving aid and are now also 
critically looking at corruption, human rights, democracy and the quality of 
institutions in recipient countries. This is underpinned by Claessens et al. (2009), who 
investigate aid allocation for a large number of donor countries for the period 1970-
2004. They find that recipients’ policies and institutional environment measured by 
the World Bank’s CPIA index are significant factor in the decision to allocate aid 
since the 1990s but not before. Nonetheless, despite this development there remain 
large differences in behaviour across the various donors. 
 
I include a number of variables that capture donor self-interest, recipient need and 
good governance that are commonly used in the aid literature. In addition I add a few 
variables that particularly relate to the agricultural sector. Three indicators for 
recipient need are incorporated in the analysis. The most common variable is income 
per capita, measured in purchasing power parity and constant 2000 US$ taken from 
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the World Development Indicator (WDI) database published by the World Bank. If 
agricultural aid is allocated to alleviate overall poverty, poor countries are expected to 
receive more than rich countries. I add three variables that pertain especially to food 
security and agricultural development. First domestic food supply expressed as the 
average daily per capita calorie supply in thousand calories is included as a proxy for 
the state of food security in the recipient country. This variable has also been used by 
Neumayer (2005) and Kuhlgatz et al. (2010) in studies on the allocation of food aid. 
More direct variables for food security that also takes into account access to food, 
such as undernourishment, would be preferable but these are not available for recent 
years. Secondly, as a proxy for the performance of the agricultural sector, cereal yield 
in kilogram per hectare is included. It is assumed that low yield figures are associated 
with an agricultural sector that is characterised by a larger number of small scale 
farmers with limited access to inputs (credit, fertilizer, machinery and seeds) and 
technology (agricultural R&D and extension services). Such countries are expected to 
receive more agricultural aid, all else equal. Finally, I include rural population as 
explanatory variable for the size of the agricultural sector in the analysis. This 
variable reflects the potential target group that may directly benefit from aid to 
agriculture. Domestic food supply and rural population are taken from FAOSTAT and 
cereal yield from the WDI database.     
 
Three indicators for donor interest are included. The first is the number of years a 
recipient country has been a colony of the donor country in the period 1900-1960, 
taken from Alesina and Dollar (2000). It is well known that many donors maintain 
close linkages with former colonies for historical, political and commercial reasons. It 
has for instance been pointed out that lobbying by ethnic groups in the donor country 
may influence the aid allocation decision (Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller 2000). 
Colonial status is only included for the Netherlands (Indonesia and Suriname) and the 
USA (the Philippines). Japan had one colony (Burma) but for this country there is no 
sufficient information available to include it in the analysis. The second variable is the 
geographical distance between the capital of the donor and the recipient country 
(Gleditsch and Ward 2001). This captures the fact that some donors might want to 
maintain strategic influence in neighbouring countries or regions while others take a 
more global approach. A final variable for donor interest is the flow of bilateral trade 
that measures the strength of commercial links between the donor and recipient.  In 
line with comparative advantage, the size of agricultural imports from developing 
countries to donor countries is much larger than the reverse export flow. Hence, I 
assume that the potential strategic interest of donor countries lies predominantly in 
safeguarding the supply of important food and cash crops from developing countries. 
This is measured by including the value of total Food and Live Animals (SITC 01) a 
donor country imports from a recipient country as a share of the donor’s total imports. 
Data are taken from the OECD trade database. 
 
In line with Neumayer (2003), two indicators are included for governance. 
Democracy is measured as the unweighted sum of the political rights and civil 
liberties indices constructed by Freedom House (2010). Both indices take values from 
1 (best) to 7 (worst). A composite measure is created by adding the scores from the 
two indices and recoding the index so that it ranges from 2 (worst) to 14 (best). 
Human rights are measured by the Political Terror Scale (PTS) that is based on 
Amnesty International’s annual human right reports as well as the US Department of 
State’s Country reports on human rights practices. Both indices range from 1 (best) to 
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5 (worst). For the purpose of this paper, I take the simple average and reverse the 
resulting index so that 1 means worst and 5 best human rights performance. 
  
All explanatory dependent variables except democracy and human rights are logged. 
Since both the dependent and the independent variables are in log form the 
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities in the second stage panel data models. 
The governance variables are not logged because they are ordinal indicators. It is 
difficult to interpret a percentage change in democracy and human rights.  
2.3 Methodology 
The number of developing countries that receive aid varies from donor to donor and 
over time. Most donor countries only provide aid to a selected number of recipient 
countries. In particular small donors tend to concentrate their limited means on a 
relative small number of recipients while big donors are likely to support a wide range 
of developing countries. This means that the distribution of aid data on a donor by 
donor basis is truncated, that is to say, characterised by many ‘zero’ observations and 
a relatively small number of positive figures. Standard OLS estimation is not suited to 
deal with the nonlinearity in the dataset.  
  
To address this issue three different econometric strategies have been proposed in the 
aid allocation literature.3 The first strategy is the two-part model. In the first part – the 
selection stage – a probit model is estimated to determine the probability of receiving 
development aid. In the second part – the allocation stage – a linear regression model 
is used to investigate what determines the amount of aid developing countries receive 
from donors. The second model only uses a subsample of observations for which aid 
is positive. The two-part procedure treats both estimations as independent from each 
other and therefore assumes that the error terms of both models are not correlated.  
 
The second strategy is Heckman’s two-step estimator, which is similar to the two part 
model except that it corrects for the possible selection bias in the second step. This 
works best when an exclusionary variable is identified that impacts upon the selection 
stage but not upon the allocation stage. In practice, however, it is very difficult to 
identify variables that affect aid eligibility but not the allocated amount of aid.4    
 
The third strategy is the Tobit model which uses a one-step approach to take into 
account the truncated nature of the data. The difference with Heckman’s model is that 
by definition the independent variables have the same impact (both in size and sign) 
on the probability of obtaining aid and the amount of aid allocated. 
 
Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) and Berthélemy (2006) using a large three dimensional 
(donor, recipient and time) panel dataset on aid flows find that the differences 
between Heckman, fixed effects, random effects, OLS and random effect Tobit 
models are small. Also Neumayer (2005) finds similar outcomes for the two-part 
model and Heckman’s two-step estimator. In this paper I will use the two part model 
to investigate the allocation of aid to agriculture. A sensitivity analysis (non-reported) 
using the random effects Tobit model arrives at very similar results.  
                                                 
3
 See Neumayer (2003a) for a more extensive discussion. 
4
 Only a few authors have used Heckman’s two-step estimator. See Neumayer (2003b) and Berthélemy 
(2006) for applications. 
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For the selection and allocation stages a probit and random effects model are applied, 
respectively. Both models are estimated with robust standard errors to correct for 
potential heteroscedasticity and with the inclusion of year-specific time dummies to 
take into account the trend in overall aid to agriculture (Figure 1). All time-varying 
explanatory variables enter the models with a one-year lag to account for the fact that 
policymakers need time to collect and assess information on potential target countries 
before the decision to allocate aid can be made. The lag also controls for potential 
reverse causality between aid and some of the independent variables. For example, 
more aid to agriculture can have positive effects on yield per hectare, calorie supply 
and through (agricultural) growth on GDP per capita. 
 
The sample covers the period 1996-2008 for which data in aid to agriculture is 
available. It is restricted to countries on the 2008 OECD DAC list that registers all 
least developed countries, low income countries and middle income countries eligible 
to receive official development assistance (ODA).5 In this way a few high-income 
countries (e.g. Hong Kong, Israel, South Korea and Singapore) that used to qualify for 
development assistance in the past are eliminated from the analysis. The DAC Aid 
statistics database only shows positive aid values. It therefore does not distinguish 
between eligible DAC countries that do not receive aid in a certain year from a certain 
donor and countries that no longer qualify to receive aid (both values are recorded as 
missing). The former group is relevant for the analysis and their values are set to zero. 
The second group might create a bias and is therefore removed from the sample.  
 
The panel is unbalanced as some explanatory variables have limited coverage for 
some countries and years. At maximum 112 countries are included for each period.    
3 Results 
The estimation results for the selection state are presented in Table 1. Poorer countries 
have a higher chance to receive aid to agriculture from Japan and the Netherlands but 
not from the USA. Also countries with a large rural population have a higher 
probability to be eligible for aid. A lower calorie per capita supply renders a country 
more likely to receive aid to agriculture. In contrary to expectations, countries that 
have a higher cereal yield per hectare receive more agricultural aid from the USA. 
This finding is explained by the high level of aid to agriculture to Egypt, also one of 
the countries with the highest yield, before 2002. Only in the case of the Netherlands, 
colonies have a higher change of receiving aid. Geographical proximity increases the 
probability of receiving aid to agriculture from the USA but not from Japan and the 
Netherlands. The impact of agricultural imports on aid eligibility differs between the 
three donor countries. For the USA a higher share of food and live animals import 
even decrease the probability of receiving aid to agriculture. For the Netherlands and 
Japan the coefficient is positive and in case of the latter the effect is significant. With 
respect to the governance indicators, countries with a high score for democracy are 
given preference over countries with a poor record by the USA and the Netherlands. 
In contrast, countries are more likely to receive aid from Japan if they have a good 
human rights record, while this does not seem to be a factor for the other two donors.  
 
                                                 
5
 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/48/41655745.pdf (accessed 12-02-2011). 
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Estimations for the allocation stage are reported in Table 2. For none of the donors 
income per capita is significantly related to the amount of aid to agriculture. In line 
with expectations, countries with a large number of people living in rural conditions, 
and indicator for the size of the target group, receive more aid to agriculture. Only for 
the Netherlands lower domestic food production is a significant factor (at the 10 
percent level) in allocating aid to agriculture. For USA and Japan the sign is also 
negative but not significant. Countries with a higher cereal yield receive more aid to 
agriculture from the Netherlands and Japan. Similar to findings for the USA in the 
selection stage, both donors tend to give more aid to countries with high agricultural 
performance, in particular China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia and Vietnam. No 
significant effects are found for the relationship between colonial status and the 
amount of aid to agriculture but countries that are closer to the USA and the 
Netherlands receive more aid to agriculture than other. Similar to the results from the 
selection analysis, Japan tends to favour countries from which it imports more 
agricultural products. The opposite is true for the Netherlands and for the USA where 
a negative or not-significant effect is found. Finally, countries with a good democracy 
record receive more aid from Japan and the Netherlands while human rights does not 
seem to be a relevant in the aid allocation decision of the three donor countries. 
 
Table 1: Selection stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 USA Japan The Netherlands 
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.042 -0.119** -0.116** 
 (0.057) (0.060) (0.055) 
Ln(rural population) 0.388*** 0.250*** 0.358*** 
 (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) 
Ln(food production) -1.808*** -0.430 -1.226*** 
 (0.329) (0.352) (0.376) 
Ln(yield)  0.192*** -0.040 0.056 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.071) 
Ln(colony) 0.092 - 0.232** 
 (0.097)  (0.095) 
Ln(distance) -0.450*** 0.070 -0.010 
 (0.093) (0.103) (0.097) 
Ln(imports) -0.131*** 0.152** 0.012 
 (0.051) (0.060) (0.054) 
Democracy 0.104*** 0.023 0.100*** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Human rights 0.011 0.331*** -0.021 
 (0.053) (0.057) (0.052) 
N 1443 1443 1443 
Pseudo R2 0.215 0.283 0.222 
Log likelihood -743.437 -661.276 -714.404 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; constant and time dummies 
not presented. 
 
No single pattern emerges from the analysis. I find that for all three donors, either in 
the selection and/or the allocation stage, donor self-interest, recipient needs and good 
governance are relevant elements in the distribution of aid to agriculture. In line with 
other studies, the Netherlands is the most altruistic donor because, apart from more 
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aid to former donors, it gives importance to large rural population, domestic food 
production and democracy. The USA and Japan pursue more mixed strategies taking 
into account a variety of recipient needs, self-interest and good governance factors. A 
typical finding for the USA is the importance of geographical proximity. In the case 
of Japan, I find that the commercial interest is an important factor in both the selection 
and allocation stage. The strong relation between trade intensity and aid allocation is 
also found by (2003a) who examines total aid allocation patterns. It seems to be 
distinctive feature of Japanese aid policy. Also the results for GDP per capita, 
democracy and human rights are similar to the findings by Neumayer. This suggest 
that many donors use the same criteria for the allocation of total aid and sectoral aid, 
including agriculture.  
 
Table 2: Allocation stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 USA Japan The Netherlands 
Ln(GDP per capita) -0.245 -0.145 0.091 
 (0.212) (0.169) (0.181) 
Ln(rural population) 0.276** 0.386*** 0.430*** 
 (0.133) (0.083) (0.106) 
Ln(food production) -1.392 -0.158 -2.208* 
 (1.191) (0.792) (1.144) 
Ln(yield) 0.341 0.313* 0.550*** 
 (0.279) (0.181) (0.200) 
Ln(colony) -0.290 - 0.209 
 (0.396)  (0.201) 
Ln(distance) -0.743** -0.370 -0.617** 
 (0.347) (0.251) (0.304) 
Ln(imports) -0.261 0.397*** -0.370** 
 (0.202) (0.133) (0.186) 
Democracy 0.055 0.105*** 0.109** 
 (0.051) (0.038) (0.047) 
Human rights -0.090 0.123 0.172 
 (0.160) (0.095) (0.131) 
N 526 957 480 
Number of countries (max) 93 110 86 
R2 0.218 0.408 0.119 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; constant and time dummies 
not presented. 
4 Conclusions 
As a consequence of the 2007/2008 food crisis, aid to agriculture has been on the rise 
again, and is expected to keep on increasing for the near future. In this context, this 
paper is a first attempt to analyse the allocation of aid to agriculture. In particular it 
has looked at the aid patterns of three donor countries: USA, the Netherlands and 
Japan, between 1995 and 2008. It has found that country-level factors, such as income 
per capita, good governance  and trade have an impact on the eligibility of countries 
to receive aid to agriculture and on the amount of aid allocated. These findings are in 
accordance with studies that examine total aid patterns. Hence it suggests that support 
to the agricultural sector by donors are part of broader aid strategies. Nonetheless, 
donors also seem to take into account sector-specific needs factors as it was found that 
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aid to agriculture is significantly related to the number of rural people and domestic 
food production. 
 
Unfortunately, due to lack of recent data it has not been possible to examine the 
impact of the recent food crisis on aid to agriculture patterns. It would be interesting 
to know if the behaviour of mayor donors has changed to anticipate the newly 
emerged food security problems in a number of developing countries or if old patterns 
of aid giving prevail. This would be an exciting topic for follow-up research when 
more recent aid data becomes available. 
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